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Abstract 
Research employing the resource-based view (RBV) has overwhelmingly focused on the upside of 
resources, namely those that provide benefits to the firm. However, an emerging research stream 
suggests that the downside of resources, namely resource weaknesses, may be crucial in gaining a 
greater understanding of the key factors that contribute to firm performance and the ability to turn 
around failing companies. We examine the infamous case of Jarvis, a firm that achieved a 
turnaround, but then experienced catastrophic failure. In so doing we explore the emergence of 
resource weaknesses, their nature and ability to combine to create a fatal organisational outcome. 
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Turnaround and Failure: 
Resource Weaknesses and the Rise and Fall of Jarvis 
Introduction 
The quest to find the actions needed to turnaround a failing firm has progressed slowly and 
with little success. After more than twenty years since Pearce and Robbin’s review of the 
turnaround literature, what we know about decline and turnaround is far outweighed by 
what is unknown and understudied.1 In particular, little theoretical headway has been 
made, although a resource-based focus has been highlighted as having potential in this 
regard.2 Turnaround research in the business history literature has tended to focus on the 
decline and rise of particular industries, with business evolution, rather than business 
revolution being prominent.3 Whilst evolutionary incrementalism is an important aspect of 
the corporate landscape, so too are events of a more rapid, discontinuous nature, with 
turnarounds providing valuable microcosms to examine such cases of dramatic change.4 We 
find the current scenario unfortunate as the skills that business historians can bring to the 
study of business turnarounds, encompassing a depth of analysis, contextual understanding, 
and an appreciation of change in the long-run, are exactly the type of attributes lacking in 
turnaround research.  
Despite the use of historical case studies being noticeably absent in many areas of 
management research, in recent years a number of studies in the business history literature 
have sought to develop strategy (and management) theory through the use of cases.5  
Included within this group are a number of articles employing the resource-based view of 
the firm (henceforth RBV).6 To date the overwhelming focus of RBV research has been on 
the set of factors that provide benefit to the firm, particularly those that may result in a 
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sustainable competitive advantage. In relation to turnarounds, contributions made by 
scholars of the small number of resource-based studies have centred on the acquisition of 
new capabilities or the redeployment of existing resources in-order to create resource 
strengths that can elevate firm performance. 7  Turnarounds frequently involve the 
installation of new management, who are not entangled in the current practices of the firm, 
and therefore, may sometimes perceive alternative ways in which to utilise existing 
resources.8  
Scholars have recently employed the RBV to explore the positive contribution of 
resources to firm performance with respect to turnarounds.9 The singular focus on the 
upside of resources, however, underplays the potential contribution the RBV can make to 
the study of turnarounds. Firm performance is dependant not just on positions of strength, 
but also weaknesses, and it is the interaction between these opposing factors that influence 
organizational outcomes.10 The small number of papers relating to the influence of resource 
weaknesses on firm performance have primarily been conceptual in nature, which we find 
surprising given the potential relevance of the concept of resources weaknesses to assist 
our understanding of turnarounds. 11 Relatedly, Trahms et al. argue that investigation into 
resources that detract from a firm’s ability to generate rent may be crucial in understanding 
limitations to the ability of a firm to turnaround. Furthermore, Trahms et al. argue that in 
order to understand more about corporate turnaround, fine-grained analysis is required 
that not only examines instances of sustained turnaround, but also cases where the final 
outcome is one of failure, with the firm being forced to cease trading.12  
To address this research gap we explore the characteristics of resource weaknesses that 
may hinder and prevent a sustained turnaround, ultimately leading to business demise, 
through a longitudinal case study of Jarvis. In so doing, we build on the work of West and 
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DeCastro, who highlight the nature of resource weaknesses and inadequacies, but call for 
future developmental work, believing that the idiosyncratic nature of weaknesses and their 
evolution over time requires rich case studies and longitudinal research in order to help 
explore the origins and categories of resource weaknesses. In their conceptual work, West 
and DeCastro propose that weaknesses must be rare with respect to both industry and the 
firm within its strategic context. A firm may exhibit a certain kind of weakness, but if 
unrelated to strategic context and behaviour, it would not be a critical point of weakness. In 
developing this further, West and DeCastro point out that weaknesses may become more 
pronounced if either firm strategy or industry changes take place, thus making their 
presence salient.13 We explore the type of strategic change that may result in resource 
weaknesses becoming more salient, and therefore more dangerous, to the performance of 
the organization. 
Closely linked to the work of West and DeCastro, Arend’s conceptualization of 
weaknesses as strategic liabilities draws on Barney’s RBV tenets (valuable, rare, inimitable 
and non-substitutable) to define strategic liabilities as those resources that damage and 
destroy a firm’s ability to generate rents. They are “firm factors that are costly, supply-
restricted (scarce and economically inconvertible) and appropriated (economically non-
transferable)”,14 with reasons for economic inconvertibility being similar to those for 
economic inimitability and non-substitutability, arising due to characteristics such as 
immobility, inseparability, and path dependency.15 Resource stocks cannot be changed 
instantaneously, an argument that may pertain as much to resource weaknesses as it does 
to resource strengths. The dismantlement of a firm’s resource weaknesses may, therefore, 
only be effectively accomplished over a period of time.16 It follows that for a struggling 
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company trying to improve performance, the nature and severity of the firm’s resource 
weaknesses may be critical to the chances of turnaround or failure. 
Arend suggests definitions of performance-related characteristics of strategic liabilities 
that mirror those that have evolved for strategic assets: Firms with more strategic liabilities 
perform worse; a strategic liability that fulfils the relevant characteristics more fully affects 
its owner’s performance more unfavourably; and firms with strategic liabilities that are 
complementary and firms without offsetting strategic assets, performance worse. Arend 
continues briefly to suggest that where complementary strategic liabilities exist, costs to the 
firm are higher than if the two liabilities existed separately. Whilst the notion of 
complementary resource weaknesses is clearly intriguing, further discussion, examination 
and development of these factors fall outside the scope of Arend’s research.17 To this end 
we heed Sirmon et al.’s call to explore the concept of complementarities between resource 
weaknesses, exploring how they may arise, the nature of interactions between resource 
weaknesses including how they may combine and reinforce one another over time, and 
their potential impact on firm performance.18  
In summary, our research has three clear objectives. First, we seek to make a theoretical 
contribution to the study of turnarounds, an area where theory has been noticeably lacking 
to date, employing the RBV and in particular the concept of resource weaknesses.19 Through 
a detailed analysis of the case of Jarvis we explore the factors that may hinder or prevent 
turnarounds, ultimately leading to business failure.20 In so doing, we seek to develop 
insights into the type of categories and characteristics of resource weaknesses, addressing 
calls for future research by scholars of resource weakness, and turnarounds.21 Second, it has 
been agued that strategic change may result in particular resource weaknesses becoming 
more salient and hence more damaging to the firm.22 We examine the potential for 
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resource weaknesses to become more damaging over time, through which we explore the 
type of strategic actions that can increase the relevance and liability of resource weaknesses 
to management. Third, the concept of complementarities between resource weaknesses 
has been highlighted as an area warranting further investigation.23 We explore the potential 
complementarities between resource weaknesses, and examine how they may have highly 
destructive consequences for organizational performance. 
 
Method and data 
Our research design consists of four main stages of activity. First, we engaged in 
purposeful case selection. Jarvis has previously been identified as a turnaround firm, moving 
from three years of poor performance to three years of high performance, measured by 
changes in ROCE relative to both industry participants and firms across the economy during 
the period 1989-2003.24 Given the high level of publicity in the company, we were also 
aware that Jarvis had been forced into administration a number of years after the 
turnaround. In charting the ongoing performance of the firm since 2003 it became clear that 
Jarvis had accumulated critical weaknesses that had led to a catastrophic fall. Jarvis, 
therefore, provided a valuable case in which to examine the reasons why a business that 
had achieved the rare label of turnaround, was unable to sustain the improved 
performance. By the time of its demise, Jarvis had become a toxic company in the eyes of 
media commentators, with destructive weaknesses.  
Second, we constructed a historical case for Jarvis gathering data for a twenty-two year 
period (1989 to 2010 inclusive), drawing from a plethora of sources. Whilst annual reports 
provided useful information, there was a need to search much more widely in order to gain 
a richer detail about the company, triangulate evidence and obtain intelligence that those 
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leading the organisation may not have been inclined to share. The case of Jarvis was one of 
particular public sensitivity in light of the company’s links to the Potters Bar train crash 
tragedy and therefore it is probably not surprising that interviewees from within the 
company at the time, nor those associated with its subsequent insolvency, were not 
forthcoming. Likewise, despite an exhaustive search across UK archives, no record of 
internal documents was available for consultation and contact with the firm’s insolvency 
practitioners also provided no awareness of internal documents being kept for the 
company. Despite this absence, a myriad of other valuable sources were available, far more 
plentiful than our early hopes. Financial press, other broadsheets, trade journals, academic 
journals, business magazines, investment analyst reports, government investigations and 
reports, client reports, insolvency report to creditors, books and web-based publications 
were all consulted. Source criticism constitutes a key element of historical methodology and as per 
the guidance of Kipping, Wadhwani and Bucheli, we sought to establish source validity, credibility, 
and expectations of source transparency. This process is “designed to allow researchers to 
understand not just what a source tells us about a development or topic of interest, but also the 
limits on relying on that particular source”.25 Sources produced by different authors with different 
motives and perspectives constitute an important part of historical research procedures for 
overcoming the limitations identified for a particular source. In evaluating the various data 
sources, we maintained an awareness of the conditions and intentions that may have 
underpinned their creation, seeking to provide a critical engagement with the records of the 
past. In assessing the observer we drew on the recommendations of Howell and Prevenier, 
questioning to what extent was the author’s report selective? What particular kinds of things would 
have interested this author? What events or nuances would the author have been likely to ignore?  
What prejudices would have informed the account? 26 
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 The financial press provided a particularly prominent source in the study, especially in 
light of its influence on the resource weaknesses that developed in the firm. Company 
annual reports also contained a wealth of valuable data. Both sources, however, required a 
degree of caution in their analysis. We were fortunate to be able to draw from government 
commissioned reports that interviewed all Jarvis clients, as well as investigations 
undertaken by the clients themselves. Sometimes this data provided supportive 
triangulation of evidence, but occasionally revealed instances that jarred with those 
presented in the press or other sources, which we openly then subjected to further critical 
evaluation in the text, enabling a more nuanced appreciation of the resource weaknesses 
and the effects of their interactions to emerge.27  Given the acquisitive nature of Jarvis, it 
was often necessary to perform similar searches for purchased organizations, therefore 
providing further detail, including an appreciation of capabilities brought to the group. In 
Gephart's terms, we were able to collate "a substantial archival residue" from the different 
published sources.28 
Third, we analysed the data consistent with Langley’s approach to longitudinal 
research.29 First, a timeline and narrative concerning the development of Jarvis was 
constructed, as presented in figure 1. Second, temporal bracketing was undertaken, 
identifying two distinct periods for the organization. The periods were separated by a major 
break, hence permitting “the constitution of comparative units of analysis for the 
exploration and replication of theoretical ideas”.30 We present the historical narrative in the 
next two sections. Period 1 captures the turnaround of Jarvis; and period 2 examines the 
decline and failure of Jarvis. 
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FIGURE 1 
Jarvis Timeline 1850-2010 
Year Key Events 
1850 Jarvis founded as a building and decorating business 
1959 Becomes a public company 
1986 Last family member retires 
Operations across the UK undertaking medium-to-large-sized construction projects 
1990 Acquires Shephard Hill civil engineering business 
1992 Significant project delays 
Losses of £3.7m and cash call via rights issue 
1993 Realisation of major pricing errors 
1994 New CEO appointed 
News strategic plan put to shareholders – shift to construction services and niche 
focus 
1995 Workforce cut by one-fifth 
1996 Purchase of Northern Infrastructure Maintenance Company (NIMCO) 
1998 Acquisitions: Relayfast and Fastline in rail, Streamline in roads. 
2000 Market leader for school PFI work 
Contracts signed for capital value £242m with estimated £1bn whole life cost over 
25-30 years. 
2002 Potters Bar rail crash 
Legal action started against Railtrack and Jarvis by victims 
2003 Kings Cross express train derailment 
Network Rail announced Jarvis management team to be subject to ‘special audit’ 
Jarvis announced it will quit track maintenance work 
Delays to schools’ work hits national news 
CEO announced he will step down 
Scaling back of refurbishment work with aim to focus on new builds 
2004 Teachers’ union campaign against contract being awarded to Jarvis 
Turnaround consultants brought in 
Retrenchment plan initiated 
£256m loss announced 
Major FT article on Jarvis troubles 
BBC Money Programme on Jarvis 
Flagship Lancaster University project delayed and accusations of poor workmanship 
CEO resigns 
Plans to exit PFI work 
Roads unit sold 
Sale of Tubelines stake 
Debt for equity swop 
2006 Focus on track renewal and plant hire 
Failure to find buyer for 31 facilities management contracts 
2009 Fifteen percent of workforce cut in reaction to failure to capture new work 
2010 Failure to secure agreement with lenders 
Company forced into administration 
 
Finally, we used the two time periods as comparative units of analysis for the exploration 
of theoretical ideas. In exploring the turnaround and subsequent failure of Jarvis we 
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engaged in a process of theorization, meshing together both inductive and deductive 
reasoning. In doing so, we moved back and forwards between the theory and the data, 
linking our inductive ideas with existing concepts and frameworks.31 
 
Turnaround and failure: The case of Jarvis 
We present the case of Jarvis in the next two sections, and then progress to our 
theorization of the case in the discussion section. 
 
Period 1: The turnaround of Jarvis 
Jarvis was founded as a building and decorating business in Shoreditch, London, by John 
Jarvis in 1850. The company gradually expanded its building activities in the 1920s and 30s, 
undertaking a range of projects, from underground stations and municipal garages, to 
factories and offices, seeking to build a reputation for high quality workmanship sufficient to 
increase its client base.32 Jarvis became a public company in 1959, with the Jarvis family still 
actively involved and eager to further grow the business. Profits of £43,000 in 1961 had 
increased to £118,000 by 1968, and a decade later had risen to £519,000.33 As per the 
experience of many in the construction industry, there were also challenging years. Sir 
Adrian Jarvis noted the difficulties of maintaining returns in periods of full employment in 
the 1960s.34 Similarly challenging were periods of recession in the 1970s, where margins fell 
to less than 2%.35  With low gearing and often substantial cash resources, the firm 
weathered these adversities and continued to increase its work-flow, recording a profit of 
over £700,000 by the early 1980s. 36 By the time the last family member retired in 1986, 
Jarvis had grown substantially from its London origins, primarily undertaking medium to 
large-sized construction projects for a wide spectrum of clients across a much larger 
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geography, but now also encompassing a property development and investment business. 
Seeing opportunities for further expansion, Mr H. Bard, a London property investor, 
together with his venture partner, Mr M. Rueben, acquired a controlling interest in Jarvis in 
1987, bringing new board members and an aggressive expansion plan for the company, 
aimed at rapidly creating a national construction capability, both by organic and acquisitive 
growth.  They were joined by Patrick Rogers in 1988 to further this strategy, moving from his 
corporate finance and investment research position in the City.37 Within eighteen months 
Jarvis had already doubled in size and the new approach had not gone unnoticed by industry 
observers: “Throughout the recession, Jarvis has gained a reputation as a vulture company 
poised to pick up the pieces of broken companies. From the outside it may seem as if Jarvis 
is hell bent on building an empire while the going is good”.38 Acquisitions such as Auldyn 
Building and H. Webb construction expanded geographical coverage, whilst the company 
also expressed a desire to add complementary construction skills to the business, taking 
advantage of the recession to buy failed companies from the receivers.39 In 1990 Jarvis 
acquired both a shop-fitters and a civil engineering firm. Whilst the new Chairman had 
stated his intention to grow by both organic and acquisitive growth, in reality it was the 
latter that was the primary driver of the expansion. The acquisition of the Shephard Hill civil 
engineering business, with a turnover of £53m, substantially extended the productive 
opportunity set of Jarvis, with expertise added to the group in roads and bridges, water 
supply and treatment, dams and reservoirs, and coastal defence works.40 Shephard Hill’s 
failure had been triggered by the collapse of one of its bankers, to which it owed £4.5m, but 
despite the harsh recessionary climate, the performance of the civil engineering business 
was soon helping to offset some of the poor returns from Jarvis’s construction operations, 
with the group achieving a pre-tax profit of just £238,000 in 1991.41 
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The following year saw group performance fall significantly further, with losses of £3.7m 
resulting in a cash call via a rights issue. Demand was failing to match the new scale of the 
construction operations and with a shortage of work, turnover fell from £119.7m to £92.1m 
and excess capacity resulted in the announcement of redundancies. Problems with existing 
contracts were in evidence, with delays to three projects exacerbating the financial woes. A 
year later, little improvement had been made, with losses of £3.15m and delays to major 
contracts in both the building division and civil engineering works being cited as 
contributory factors. From a relatively conservative company, with net borrowings of just 
11% of shareholders’ funds, rapid expansion had led to a scenario that in 1993 a rights issue 
was needed to improve liquidity.42 Jarvis was also feeling the impact of errors it was now 
making in its aggressive pricing of contracts: 
 
“…contracts are only won if optimistic assumptions are made about progress, 
productivity, ground conditions and the weather. Inevitably, some of these 
assumptions prove to be incorrect, but the attainable margins are insufficient to 
cover the risk of this occurring and the anticipated positive contribution turns 
into a significant loss which has to be financed, even if there is an expectation of 
an eventual improvement. The company had to contend with a number of such 
contracts during the year.”43 
 
With financial pressure quickly mounting, Jarvis needed a turnaround. Changes in 
leadership were initiated with a new CEO and investor recruited, Paris Moayedi, coupled 
with three new directors.44 As the company announced losses of £4.9m in 1994, a new 
strategic plan was put to shareholders, comprising the following key elements: (i) 
rationalisation of construction businesses and a shift to becoming managers of construction 
services; (ii) development of niche markets, through Jarvis Projects, including education and 
healthcare, by offering construction-related professional services; and (iii) overhead 
reductions. Integral to the measures was the conversion of the £3m overdraft facility with 
13 
 
National Westminster Bank into a five-year loan and an additional £1.2m being made 
available to the company via a new overdraft facility.45  
With immediate effect, a re-organization ensued, with numerous construction offices 
closed, new senior management appointed, a reduction in the total workforce of almost 
one-fifth, and a concerted effort to win new work, resulting in an increased order book. 
Efforts were soon rewarded with a modest profit of £510,000 in 1995, but more dramatic 
changes were on the horizon. Five years prior, Jarvis’s purchase of the civil engineering 
business Shephard Hill from the receivers had opened up new opportunities for the group. 
Shephard Hill’s skill base in road schemes, bridges and water supply, had been cited as 
important capabilities associated with the acquisition. One of these areas, the construction 
of bridges, had led to a number of projects being undertaken for Railtrack, including bridge, 
station and platform building work. By 1995, “rail schemes” had been added to the list of 
niche markets that were the focus of the civil engineering division.46 
While just a small part of the overall group at this time, the link with the railways soon 
took on a whole new magnitude. Shares in Jarvis rose by 40% in May 1996 with an 
announcement that the company had purchased a railway maintenance company, backed 
by a rights issue. The Northern Infrastructure Maintenance Company (NIMCo) was the last 
of the seven regional infrastructure companies to be privatised by the UK government and 
undertook most of its work for Railtrack. The £9m purchase price appeared highly attractive, 
with contracts in place lasting for three to five years and generating operating profits of 
£14.8m on a turnover of £126.4m.47 
Within just two years of assuming leadership of Jarvis, Paris Moayedi had facilitated a 
repositioning of the company and now stated his intention to focus on expanding the 
facilities management business and finding efficiencies in the railway track maintenance 
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division.48 Amidst the euphoria of the deal, Jarvis’s management acknowledged “we do have 
a lot of our eggs in one basket with Railtrack”.49 Further acquisitions in the proceeding two 
years bolstered the rail business. To supplement the railway infrastructure operations, a 
track renewal capability was acquired via the purchase of Relayfast and Fastline, giving the 
group the ability to maintain and renew track anywhere in Britain.50 Relayfast also brought 
with it heavy plant resources and the combined companies gave Jarvis such a commanding 
position in the track renewals business that the takeover was only approved by the 
Monopolies and Mergers Commission on condition of Jarvis hiring out equipment to other 
operators.51 By 1998, turnover was up to £355m, with profits amounting to £37m.52  
Expansion wasn’t just restricted to the rail business. A dispute between Railtrack and 
Jarvis over pricing had provided a warning signal that helped fuel a desire to try and avoid 
an over-reliance on rail. Railtrack had argued Jarvis’s prices were up to six times higher than 
those of other contractors for similar work and had threatened to suspend Jarvis from 
bidding on other projects unless it cut its prices.53 Within hours of the disagreement going 
public, both sides said they had resolved their differences and looked forward to 
“continuing their constructive relationship”,54 but the event had provided a stark example of 
the potential consequences of any fallout with their dominant client. 
In 1998, Jarvis acquired Streamline Holdings for approximately £185m. Streamline’s 
specialist road service businesses in the UK and Europe were viewed as complementary to 
Jarvis’s operations in the rail sector and provided an opportunity to help create a broader 
transport infrastructure company. 55  While the track renewal businesses had been 
considered as a good deal for Jarvis, reuniting the maintenance and renewal operations of 
railway infrastructure that had been split from each other as part of the government’s 
privatisation programme, Streamline was regarded by analysts as a “full-price” purchase, 
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with Moayedi left justifying “you cannot get a bargain buying a public company in a niche 
market which is producing margins of 10 per cent”.56 Within a period of around four years, 
the market capitalisation of Jarvis had gone from about £10m to close to £1bn.57   
In addition to the railway and road businesses, Jarvis was also making progress towards 
becoming a more “niche-focused” construction operator, both in the education sector and 
healthcare.58 In particular, Jarvis was having considerable success in winning bids to build 
and maintain schools, as well as contracts for the construction of university student 
accommodation. The company was becoming highly adept at seizing Private Finance 
Initiative (PFI) work, even creating a specific PFI unit to deal with the increasing number of 
opportunities in the area.59 By 2000, Jarvis had become the market leader for school PFI 
work, securing eight of the nineteen contracts that had become available, and bringing 
Jarvis’s total school facilities projects to 47. Contracts signed in the year 1999 to 2000 had a 
combined capital value of £242 million and estimated at nearly £1bn in terms of whole life 
costs over 25-30 years.60 Although the scale of activity was now stretching the company’s 
operational capacity beyond its limits, requiring a much greater reliance on sub-contractors, 
the success rate of the division was much lauded, moving from initial submission to 
preferred bidder status in 43% of cases.61 
The Chairman commented in 2001: “The success of Jarvis’s strategy is demonstrated by 
the number of significant contract signings and our appointment as preferred bidder on 
other major projects during the year”.62 The growth of Jarvis Projects, coupled with the 
Streamline acquisition had helped to reduce the dominance of rail within the company, with 
the Chairman now referring to the group as a “well-balanced portfolio of high-added value 
services”.63 The CEO, Moayedi, emphasised the change process from “high risk, low margin” 
general contracting to “high tech, lower risk operations where price is not the only criterion 
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for selection”. 64  The evidence suggested that Moayedi had achieved a substantial 
turnaround in performance, elevating Jarvis’s return on capital from amongst the poorest to 
one of the highest relative to both its industry compatriots and firms across the economy.65 
As further PFI and railway work poured in during 2001, some commentators viewed the 
“specialist” Jarvis shares as having significant potential.66  
 
Period 2: The decline and failure of Jarvis 
In May 2002, a train travelling at high speed derailed at Potters Bar station, killing seven 
with over 70 injured. The track in question was part of Jarvis’s maintenance contract and the 
company quickly raising the possibility of sabotage on the line as a potential cause, an 
argument later rejected by the Health and Safety Executive.67 Despite Jarvis’s efforts to 
diversify the business, rail still counted for £303m of the £677m turnover and shares in the 
company reacted with a fall of 22% in just two days due to concerns over potential liabilities 
and the impact on future maintenance work. 68  One analyst commented “we don’t 
necessarily know with these contracts or any other contract where the buck stops for a 
major disaster”.69   
As turnover increased to £949m and profits to £46m in the year to March 2002, with 
Jarvis’s Chief Executive and Chief Operating Officer benefiting from cash pay rises, news of 
the company in the press was turning increasingly hostile.70 By the end of 2002, victims of 
the crash had already started legal action against Railtrack and Jarvis, and then in May 2003, 
an official report by the Health and Safety Executive stated the cause of the crash to be the 
result of a failure of points that were in poor condition and had been poorly maintained.71 
Network Rail, which had by then taken over Railtrack’s role, announced it was 
“fundamentally altering the way rail maintenance is done in the UK”.72 Jarvis’s reputation 
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suffered again when a derailment of an express train at London’s King Cross station 
occurred in September 2003. Jarvis explained that the accident occurred because its staff 
failed to disconnect equipment that allowed trains to be routed over a piece of track 
removed during maintenance. The event bore similarity to an incident with a freight train 
near Rotherham the previous November, again a track maintained by Jarvis. Whilst there 
were no injuries, the accident caused further reputational damage to Jarvis and Network 
Rail announced they would be subjecting Jarvis’s management to a special audit concerning 
the firm’s working practices.73 
On October 10 2003, Jarvis announced it would quit track maintenance work, the CEO 
commenting that “the reputational risks that are associated with this business for Jarvis 
overshadow the very successful other parts of the business”.74 A timely announcement that 
Jarvis had won the UK’s largest student accommodation contract (£339m), to build and 
manage rooms for Lancaster University, came as a welcome relief to the market. 
Accommodation services had quickly risen to account for around one-third of group 
turnover in the previous year, with Jarvis being the market leader for outsourced 
accommodation, a portfolio that included contracts to provide rooms for about 20,000 
students, accommodation for schools, the NHS, local authorities and many more. Citing a 
forward order book of £4.2bn, albeit including projects at the preferred bidder stage, there 
were high hopes that the division would drive considerable future growth for the 
company.75 
Whilst Jarvis’s executives had hoped the exit from rail maintenance would see Jarvis 
escape from being a regular feature of the news headlines, they were mistaken. In 
November 2003, Jarvis was in the news again concerning delays to a PFI project that had 
resulted in five schools opening a week late for the start of term, with further work 
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outstanding.76 Although an inconvenience, in normal circumstances the event may not have 
been worthy of national print, but as one journalist commented “since the rail accidents, 
any problem with a Jarvis contract, from schools to the underground, had been headline 
news”.77 A shareholder noted “it has become difficult to work in a spotlight”.78 Pressure 
started to mount from some investors for Paris Moayedi to stand down, whilst others were 
less convinced that this would be enough to repair reputational damage. One analyst stated 
“the name Jarvis is the biggest liability rather than Paris”, 79  while another analyst 
emphasised “the press pressure on Jarvis has got to the point where it is affecting the 
business”.80 
Jarvis was starting to find it harder to win contracts and following a board meeting, an 
announcement was made that Moayedi would step down and Stephen Norris, a former 
Conservative Transport Minister, would become Non-executive Chairman.81 In the same 
month, Jarvis announced it was scaling down school refurbishment work to concentrate on 
new-build school contracts after running into a number of problems on existing sites. The 
Chief Executive of Jarvis’s Accommodation Services explained that refurbishment projects 
were “by their very nature risk-heavy and you can say that the extent of the risk has been 
learned from experience”, referring to the delays to the Wirral schools and a similar 
experience at schools in Kirklees.82 The extent of hostility towards the company was 
highlighted further by a Derby teachers’ union campaign against a PFI contract being 
awarded to Jarvis, with the union saying “We are opposed to privatisation in principle. But 
within the process that exists in Derby … we are absolutely opposed [to Jarvis being 
awarded the contract]. We are more opposed to Jarvis than others”.83 The representative 
went on to say they were opposed to Jarvis mainly due to the company being at the centre 
of an investigation into the Potters Bar rail crash, but also because of delays on other school 
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PFI contracts.84  The PFI project manager at the Council stated “it would be foolish in the 
extreme to pretend that the council is not aware of some of the publicity that Jarvis as an 
organisation attract”.85 At a University of Lancaster Council Meeting, reference was made to 
the implications for Jarvis of the recent rail crash at Potters Bar. Noting that the company 
would be fully aware of the force of public perceptions and that “this should be taken into 
account by the negotiating team in deciding what had to be accepted on behalf of the 
university.”86 
Jarvis was beginning to look as though it was in a financially precarious position.87 The 
company had become highly dependent on front-end cash flow from new contracts and as 
new business dried up, so did this cash flow.88 The settlement of a major claim with Network 
Rail, coupled with provisions made against problems in the accommodation services division 
meant that banking covenants would be breached. A new CEO, Kevin Hyde, argued for a 
dramatic shift away from the company’s aggressive growth strategy, putting forward a plan 
for retrenchment around core operations and cost reductions.  A fundamental review of all 
activities resulted in a recovery strategy, which was to: (i) implement strategic disposals to 
reduce debt; (ii) exit non-core activities; (iii) focus on core infrastructure services; (iv) 
recover outstanding debts; (v) reduce the cost base; and (vi) scale back and exit higher risk 
activities.89 The core and non-core businesses of Jarvis are presented in table 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20 
 
TABLE 1 
The core and non-core businesses of Jarvis in 2004 
 
 Core Establish Non-core 
Rail Track renewals 
Signals & projects 
Train operations 
Rolling stock maintenance 
Freight haulage 
International sales 
Rail maintenance 
On track plant 
Tube lines 
Estonia 
Ultramast 
Rail training 
Roads Highway maintenance 
Prismo 
Optima 
Fleet management 
Small plant hire 
USA sales Prosign 
Veluvine 
Traffiroad 
TWS 
Laybond 
JAS PFI project integration 
Facilities management 
 Construction 
David Wylde Project 
Finance 
Asquith Jarvis 
PatientFirst 
Property 
Chapel Wharf 
JMPC 
JTM 
Central Property management  Braddons 
Agilisys 
 
Source: Annual Report, 2004, p5. 
To assist with the change effort, the board appointed a Chief Restructuring Officer (CRO) 
from the turnaround and restructuring specialists, AlixPartners. The CRO spent four weeks 
identifying the causes of distress, which were diagnosed as: (i) an unnecessarily complex 
business portfolio; (ii) inadequate control systems; (iii) inadequate liquidity; (iv) a “revenue-
oriented” contract portfolio; (v) dangerous levels of management turnover; and (vi) 
excessive debt and contingent liabilities.90 Additional AlixPartners consultants were brought 
in to assist in the turnaround, including a crisis manager to oversee daily operations, a 
consultant tasked with responsibility for treasury operations, and a consultant with 
expertise in construction management to assess the true financial state of active building 
projects and estimate how much money would be required to bring them to completion.91 
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Negotiations with lenders and other stakeholders gave the company a life-line, while the 
sale process of dozens of non-core assets ensued. 2004 saw Jarvis deliver a loss of £256m.92 
A key problem for Jarvis concerned the PFI contracts it had entered into. The company’s 
success rate at moving from submission to the award of contract resulted in a winner’s 
curse, with aggressive pricing meaning that assumptions tended to be overly optimistic and 
sufficient due diligence frequently lacking. Risks were consistently underestimated and the 
resultant under-pricing left Jarvis locked into unattractive contracts that would cost the 
company for years to come.93 The case of Kirklees schools provided an all too familiar story 
for the company. In bidding for work, Jarvis had failed to conduct any surveys beyond those 
provided to them by the council’s Estates and Property Services, which were “neither 
intensive nor intrusive”.94 The bid by Jarvis Projects was recommended to the panel as the 
most affordable and the only one that represented value for money.95 Jarvis had bid £96.2m 
compared to the other bids of £115m and £119m. It was noted in a later report, 
commissioned by the council, that given the unlikely scenario that Jarvis had taken the 
contract as a loss leader, they had underestimated the true costs and had massively under-
priced the work. At the time, the panel had been informed that although Jarvis were PFI 
market leaders, their expertise was in new-build and not refurbishment. There were other 
contractors at the time that specialised in construction refurbishment projects of this 
nature, but they had not applied to be put on the tender list.96 The construction phase had 
started slipping relatively early:  “alarm bells about the contractor’s performance had begun 
to ring as early as 3 or 4 months into the project”.97 Schools also commented on the poor 
quality of the workmanship, materials and finishes, which was put down to the contractor’s 
under-pricing and financial difficulties.98     
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Further bad publicity came from a substantial Financial Times article, detailing the trail of 
delays and dissatisfaction concerning Jarvis’s accommodation services projects. The 
problems that had been present the pre-turnaround Jarvis, including poor risk assessment, 
delays, quality issues and consistent under-pricing, were manifest again. In addition to a 
plethora of school blunders, the article also raised awareness of Jarvis’s problems with 
university student accommodation contracts, including its flagship contract with Lancaster 
University, again delivered late amidst calls of shoddy workmanship. Whilst the head of 
Accommodation Services resigned, accusations of late payments to subcontractors 
damaged credibility further, and in the Financial Times report, as in virtually every other 
news story, the name Jarvis was followed by a line reminding readers that this was the 
company at the centre of investigations concerning the fatal Potters Bar rail crash. 
Recognising the liability in its name, Jarvis attempted to rebrand some of its subsidiaries 
bidding for PFI work, using “Engenda” for new schools and healthcare projects, but a BBC 
Money Programme report suggesting Jarvis faced construction losses of over £5m on the 
refurbishment of just five schools, provided further bad publicity. The press reports of errors 
made by Jarvis in their PFI construction activities could not be denied with respect to their 
accuracy, with client and government reports echoing many of the failings.99 
In hindsight, however, the press intensity and ferocity directed towards the construction 
operations of the company may have been particularly severe when examining the 
performance of Jarvis in relation to other PFI construction companies. A study 
commissioned by the Department for Education and Skills into PFI projects post-contract 
signing, interviewed all schools where Jarvis had been lead contractor. Surprisingly, despite 
the high level of negative publicity, satisfaction scores for projects where Jarvis had a lead 
role were slightly higher than the average, both for the buildings and services. Lower 
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satisfaction levels were recorded for pricing variations, whereby Jarvis was suspected of 
elevating pricing of contract variations, a likely attempt to claw-back monies lost from their 
under-pricing of the main contract. Criticisms were also levelled at the poor integration of 
bidding, construction and facilities management businesses. 100 The findings of the 
investigation were barely reported at the time, but are worthy of considerable note. At a 
time when media reports of the failings of Jarvis and its construction activities were at their 
height, presenting an image of a dysfunctional firm and the laggard of its industry, actual 
satisfaction ratings with both its PFI buildings and services were above average. Regardless 
of the performance of the company relative to its peers, the public image of Jarvis meant 
that new projects were becoming almost impossible to acquire. The Jarvis brand was now a 
major resource weakness and the “unusually low success rate in winning PFI projects” was 
now creating further unrecoverable bid costs.101   
Turnover in the top management team increased with the resignation of the Finance 
Director and then the new Accommodation Services Chief Executive, the latter having only 
been in the post for five months.102 After three profit warnings in as many months, a further 
write-off of £156m was announced, with questions now being raised as to the likely survival 
of the group.103 Politicians were quick to iterate that there would be no public sector 
assistance for the company.104 Shares had been commensurately falling as worries grew, 
losing 80% of their value within six months.105 Despite Jarvis’s struggle, shares in other large 
PFI construction companies remained surprisingly firm, with analysts believing that poor 
management, rather than poor opportunities, to be culpable for the failure. This viewpoint 
was supported by national concerns that many of the construction companies undertaking 
PFI work were doing so at excessively high margins, making the losses of Jarvis even more 
embarrassing for the company.106 One analyst commented “PFI gave them [Jarvis] an 
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opportunity to grow very, very quickly, and they grabbed that opportunity too aggressively.” 
One competitor noted “Anybody who has been bidding for school contracts often found 
themselves second to Jarvis [because they were offering lower prices]”.107 
The scenario was now very different for Jarvis, with potential clients looking at a much 
wider picture. Fife council in Scotland chose to revoke the company’s status as preferred 
bidder on a £177m contract to build and maintain ten schools, a particularly worrying sign 
given that the recent recovery plan was built on the assumption of retaining existing clients 
and continuing to win new contracts. The project solicitor at the council stated that Jarvis’s 
financial position and the fact that its restructuring plan could not be resolved within the 
time-table envisaged for the project, had prevented Fife from reaching final agreement on 
the contract. Meanwhile, further delays in the handover of university accommodation 
accompanied an announcement that Jarvis would not be bidding for future work in the area, 
with the team responsible for bidding for PFI projects being sold.108  
Introduced by the Conservative government in 1992 then expanded by the Labour 
government after 1997, PFI had been intended as a way to harness the private sector’s 
efficiency, management and commercial expertise to bring greater discipline to the 
procurement of public infrastructure. PFI essentially enabled a shift of funding and 
management of public sector projects to the private sector to enable rapid improvement of 
public infrastructure without politically unacceptable tax rises. The initiative aimed to 
transfer appropriate risks to the private sector and focus on the whole life costs of 
projects.109 By 2001 over 350 PFI projects were under consideration.110 Despite the clamour 
for work, many in the construction industry had concerns from the outset, with a survey of 
builders and civil engineers viewing the excessive shouldering of risk by the private sector as 
their number one concern.111 For many large contractors, the size of the PFI market was too 
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large to ignore, but not large enough to be a single source of business. In addition, the 
sporadic nature of PFI projects, their variability in size, scope, and balance of construction 
and operations, coupled with long gestation periods and risk of government regulatory 
changes, created a degree of unpredictability for contractors.112 Bid costs were also a 
consideration, being much higher than for traditionally tendered work due to the 
complexity and longevity of contracts.113 Despite the risks, many construction firms bid for 
PFI work in the hope of obtaining higher levels of profitability and long-term income 
streams.114 Whilst the profitability of PFI for the private sector has been subject to 
considerable debate, research has suggested that for many firms, PFI projects have provided 
attractive returns, placing pressure on government to be more aggressive in negotiating 
contracts.115 Whilst many profited, however, Jarvis was not the only construction firm to get 
into difficulties through its PFI projects, with Sir Robert McAlpine, Ballast UK and Metronet 
being other exemplars of firms beset by cost overruns and delays.    
For Jarvis, the disconnect between the PFI bidding team and the rest of the business was 
mentioned by numerous Jarvis clients in the DfES investigation, making proper risk 
assessment of projects a rarity.116 A Jarvis staff member acknowledged that even if the 
company had failed to find a buyer for the PFI team it would be “going come what may”.117 
An ill-considered incentive scheme had also meant that the PFI team were rewarded for 
deals done, without due consideration of adequate margins. The result was a team adept at 
winning work, but at prices and risk levels that damaged the future health of the 
organisation. The future cash flows from many of the company’s investments in school PFI 
and university projects were sold for a loss of £6m.118 Recognising the errors in governance, 
the company announced it would combine the bidding, construction and facilities 
management functions into a single entity, operating out of a single location, but it was a 
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move already too late in the decline. The new board initiated a review of internal control 
processes and procedures, with the resulting observations that the company had significant 
shortcomings in the information provided to the board concerning the key features of 
significant transactions and insufficient independent review and challenge of complex 
commercial, legal and contractual issues. In particular, poor appreciation and handling of 
risk was raised, with new systems designed to embed risk identification and evaluation 
within the operational process of the organisation. Heads of each operating division would 
be required to report monthly on key risk matters and the agenda of the executive 
committee would be revised to separately address risk considerations on a regular basis.119   
By the end of 2004, the CEO in charge of the turnaround effort had also resigned. Of the 
nine directors listed in the 2003 Annual Report, only two now remained. The news that five 
executives who had left the firm received bonuses of £800,000 for the year in which the 
Potters Bar crash occurred, further dented an image that was now looking far beyond 
repair. 120 To make matters worse, the incoming CEO, who had undertaken an urgent 
review, announced that the financial situation was worse than expected, with total group 
cash outflow likely to be £80m higher than previously forecast. The Chairman warned that a 
substantial proportion of the proceeds from ongoing asset sales would now be needed for 
working capital rather than for debt repayment. Shares tumbled a further 60% on the news 
to 13p, a sharp contrast to the 575p price obtained just over two and a half years prior. The 
company was now in a vicious circle. With sub-contractors not getting paid, work was 
grinding to a halt, therefore, incurring financial penalties for failing to meet deadlines.121  
With debts standing at an estimated £240m, strategy was changing by the week. In 
December 2004, plans were detailed to exit all PFI work and concentrate on plant hire and 
building roads and railways for Network Rail and local authorities. Less than two weeks 
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later, the roads unit had been sold for £24.5m.122 Further efforts to improve corporate 
governance were made, “focusing directly on the shortcomings of processes and procedures 
that led the Company to its current position”, with risk analysis being a key factor in the 
committee’s work.123 Pre-tax losses widened to £354m in 2005, but the sale of a one-third 
stake in Tubelines, a private consortium to manage, maintain and upgrade a third of the 
London Underground network, and then a debt-for-equity swop, provided a further life-line 
for the company, with shareholders giving up 95% of their ownership in exchange for the 
£350m of debt. A more manageable balance sheet emerged with a net debt of £22.2m. The 
company bonus scheme was suspended for 2005. Ironically the bonus scheme had been 
based on objectives that included profitable forward order book growth and effective risk 
management, both features that had been markedly lacking in prior executive performance, 
despite bonus payments being made.124 As part of the corporate governance review, further 
changes were made to the processes aimed at evaluating business risks, with risk 
management reviews being incorporated into the whole commercial “tender to delivery” 
process.125 
By early 2006, the business focus had shrunk primarily to track renewal and plant hire, 
the winding down of the construction business helping to stem the cash outflow, although 
Jarvis had yet to find a buyer for 31 of its facilities management contracts, five of them loss-
making.126 Ironically, following the rash of disposals, the rail sector now accounted for the 
majority of turnover once again at approximately 65%.127 As some saw Jarvis “emerging 
from the intensive care ward,” the fragile state of the company was still of concern.128 The 
exit of the CEO that had been at the helm of the latest restructuring did little to calm fears 
and the future was now pinned on the rail business being chosen as one of four major 
contractors appointed by Network Rail for significant track renewal work.129 
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To the surprise of some, Jarvis was selected as one of the four, but the promise of an 
immediate uplift in activity was short-lived. Network Rail announced its intention to 
increase overall renewal volumes in the medium term, but reduce volumes in the short-
term, unfortunately a critical time for Jarvis. Management reacted to the news by cutting 
450 staff, 15% of the workforce, but lenders were becoming concerned for the viability of 
the company without new orders coming through.130  For continued lender support, 
guarantees of future payments from Network Rail were required, but meetings between 
Jarvis, its lenders, and Network Rail officials, failed to secure any such agreement and a 
formal statement to the stock exchange was issued: “following negotiations with the 
company’s secured lenders, it has become clear that sufficient support will not be extended 
to the company to enable it to continue trading as a going concern”.131 One commentator 
summarised the position: “Jarvis, one of the most infamous names in the world of British 
engineering over the last ten years, has finally been forced into administration”.132  
 
Discussion 
Despite the RBV now being a mainstream theory in strategy and management research, its 
application to the study of turnarounds has so far been limited.133 Where utilised, there has 
been an overwhelming focus on the upside of resources, namely where they may result in a 
sustained competitive advantage, yet this may overlook the other side of the ledger, the 
resources that damage profitability for the firm. Calls have been made for detailed 
longitudinal case studies to build on the conceptual work on resource weaknesses 
undertaken by West and DeCastro, and Arend.134 The business history field appears 
particularly well placed to help achieve such an aim, and in so doing, promote greater 
connectivity between mainstream management and business history research. 135 
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Furthermore, studies of turnarounds can provide further evidence within the business 
history literature of more radical and discontinuous change, to complement the 
considerable wealth of business history studies that deal with incremental evolution.136 An 
examination of resource weaknesses in the case of Jarvis, a firm that made desperate efforts 
to turnaround, yet eventually succumbed to failure, provides valuable insight into factors 
that may hinder or prevent turnaround.  
With over a century of trading, Jarvis had gradually grown to become a well respected 
construction firm, undertaking a range of medium to large sized projects for wide client 
base, under the guidance of the Jarvis family. Like many other construction firms, the 
company had suffered in numerous cyclical downturns, yet had showed substantial 
resilience, in part due to a conservatism that ensured relatively low debt levels were 
maintained. New ownership in the 1980s brought ambitions expansion plans, with debt-
financed acquisitions quickly taking the company to a new scale and scope. As turnover 
increased, profitability fell, and as the company struggled to find sufficient work in the 
recessionary climate, financial concerns escalated to the extent that a change in leadership, 
coupled with a further injection of funds, was required to ensure the continuation of the 
firm. The early stages in the turnaround of Jarvis followed a familiar formula of leadership 
change, refocusing and repositioning.137 Unaddressed, however, was an underlying resource 
weakness in the evaluation and management of construction risks, which had emerged 
during the period of rapid expansion. In a highly competitive environment where new 
business was hard to obtain, Jarvis was finding it had persistent problems in its existing 
activities, with recurring errors in the assessment and management of contracts damaging 
profitability. Inadequate due diligence as to the likely risks and potential costs of projects 
resulted in consistent under-pricing, and work managed by Jarvis was often subject to 
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subsequent delays in completion. 138  Whilst the weaknesses were recognised by the 
management team, new leadership believed the best course of action to be the re-
orientation of the company from a traditional construction firm to a manager of 
construction services, with niches in areas such as education and healthcare.139 At the time 
the sale of a number of rail maintenance and renewal companies, as part of the UK 
government’s rail privatisation programme, presented an opportunity to fast track the 
strategic re-orientation of the company. 
The purchase of one such organization, NIMCo, realised Moayedi’s ambitions to become 
a service-oriented company in a niche market for what many regarded to be a low price 
given the limited competition and long-term assured contract.140 Whilst a bold move, path-
breaking acquisitions of this nature have been highlighted in the turnaround literature as a 
potential way of rapidly bringing new capabilities to an organisation where a fundamental 
shift in strategic focus is desired.141 For a firm that had found itself with capabilities no 
longer able to provide competitive advantage, such an approach offers a potential escape 
route, yet one that also contains an element of risk that may be not be fully recognised by 
the incumbent leadership. Whilst the CEO, Moayedi, believed that in turning Jarvis around 
the company had moved from “…high risk, low margin” general contracting to “…high tech, 
lower risk operations..,” 142  in reality, through further debt-finance acquisitions, the 
company had moved into an area with considerable risk and a degree of unfamiliarity for 
the management team.  
Much as been written concerning the identification, development and exploitation of 
resource strengths over time, with complexity and causal ambiguity being cited as factors 
that may benefit a firm by hindering imitation by competitors.143 In contrast, West and 
DeCastro point to complexity and causal ambiguity as being potential dangers with respect 
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to resource weaknesses, with liabilities remaining hidden before emerging suddenly to 
damage profitability.144 In the case of Jarvis, however, management showed an awareness 
of their deficiencies, yet also believed that the performance problems of the company could 
be overcome by strategic reorientation to more lucrative business areas.145 The existing 
literature on turnarounds highlights the important role of the environment in turnarounds, 
in particular its role in relation to decline.146 Research examining external causes of 
organizational decline has focused on a range of factors (not exhaustively) including: 
environmental jolts, technological changes, industry decline, and competitive dynamics.147 
For Jarvis and many other construction companies, however, changes in the environment by 
way of government shifts to PFI work, were cautiously viewed as a new opportunity, and 
one that was too large to be ignored. On the surface, the turnaround strategy appeared to 
be effective. Jarvis was one of the first movers to take advantage of the government’s PFI 
scheme in the education sector. Contracts usually encompassed both a build and 
maintenance agreement, resulting in long-term revenue streams. With a conversion rate 
from bid submission to signed contract ahead of its peers, Jarvis rapidly became recognised 
as the market leader. As Jarvis benefitted from the generous margins in its rail business, 
coupled with upfront payments on its PFI projects, both turnover and profits grew apace, 
while market capitalisation escalated from £10m to almost £1bn.148  
Within the turnaround strategy, however, the seeds of future problems had already been 
sown. Failure to address the resource weaknesses present in the assessment and 
management of construction risk ensured their continuation as Jarvis moved into new 
activities. Much of the PFI work involved refurbishment of existing buildings. Whilst Jarvis 
had a good track record in the construction of new premises, they were less skilled in 
undertaking refurbishment contracts. As highlighted in the DfES report, interviews with 
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Jarvis’s clients commonly resulted in the comment “Jarvis were fine in the new build but for 
the refurbishment was not of a standard we would expect”.149 By their very nature, 
refurbishment projects carry a greater degree of risk, with under pricing a higher likelihood 
due to the emergence of unforeseen problems and costs. In-depth due diligence, including a 
thorough appraisal of potential risks, may go some way in circumventing such occurrences. 
In both these areas, however, the approach taken by Jarvis was regarded as lackadaisical, 
with later corporate governance committees highlighting the absence of appropriate risk 
evaluation throughout the organisation. To make matters worse, the PFI bidding team, 
incentivised to get deals done, were disconnected from the construction operations of the 
company, resulting in a scenario where contracts were frequently won at prices that could 
not be profitably delivered. 
From a resource-based perspective, the rapid expansion of a firm can bring critical 
challenges. Penrose emphasises the risks that “there are times when the difficulty of making 
the necessary administrative adaptations may result in a very critical period in a firm’s 
growth during which its continued existence hangs in the balance”.150 In particular, Penrose 
notes that the risks that may evolve from expansion of a complex nature, not only due to 
the “greater variety of managerial tasks to perform”, but also by way of the integration with 
the rest of the firm.151 For Jarvis, as expansion increased, the corporate governance and risk 
management processes of the firm became inadequate for the new demands placed upon 
it, a factor frequently overlooked in the resource-base of a firm.152 As management failed to 
evaluate and control the new risks, the lack of integration between activities only 
exacerbated problems further.  
The process of success and failure is central to Penrose’s view of the resource-based 
view. Penrose discusses the fact that the future can never be known with accuracy, and that 
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manager’s decisions “are based on expectations about the future that which are held with 
varying degrees of confidence”.153 As managers are forced to take decisions on the basis of 
imperfect information in an uncertain environment, some decisions will inevitably turn out 
ex post to have been unfortunate despite having been made with the ex ante intention of 
maximizing profits. Where managers do not deploy the resources in an efficient manner, 
their actions may reveal information that will enable them to learn and make more 
informed decisions over time, and if not the firm may fail and the resources be re-circulated 
in to the economy to be used by others. The process of success and failure, therefore, are 
central to Penrose’s view of the resource-based view, and is one that aligns closely with 
Austrian economics.154 
In addition to the problem of imperfect information, Penrose highlighted the influence of 
path-dependence on managerial decision-making. She argued that: “the services that 
resources will yield depend on the capacities of the men using them, but the development 
of the capacities of men is partly shaped by the resources men deal with. The two together 
create the special productive opportunity of a particular firm.”155 Hence, the managers of 
every firm confront a different set of resources leading them to make different strategic 
decisions that, in turn, further modify the resource bundle. In addition to the problems of 
imperfect information, therefore, firm failure may arise through the path dependent nature 
of managerial choices that lock firms in to corridors of activity and/or may hinder the 
managers of the firm from learning over time. In the case of Jarvis, the market changed 
around how government contracted for the long-run maintenance of public sector infra-
structure through the PFI initiative. The problem for the management of Jarvis was that they 
systematically misdiagnosed the risk and under-priced the contracts they won, which then 
locked them into long-run losses. The nature of the contracts significantly reduced 
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management’s ability to address their decisions, even if they were able to fully learn from 
their mistakes. 
Relatedly, West and DeCastro suggest that weaknesses are not static, and may become 
more pronounced if either firm strategy or industry changes take place.156 For Jarvis, the 
shift to focus on niche PFI contracts unwittingly had the effect of significantly increasing the 
long-term value destruction emanating from the resource weakness.157 As Jarvis won more 
and more long-term PFI contracts, the salience of the resource weaknesses vis-á-vis its 
competitors became more pronounced. As upfront payments accumulated, in the short-
term, management were unaware of the underlying dangers in their construction activities 
and focus was drawn to the rail side of the company. 
Scholars of the RBV suggest that the resource-base of a firm cannot be changed 
instantaneously, and it has been proposed that like strengths and competencies, 
weaknesses and inadequacies will take time to develop and manifest themselves.158 The 
Jarvis case, however, raises the possibility that for resource weaknesses, there may 
sometimes be a greater immediacy of change, highlighting a potential asymmetry with the 
characteristics of resource strengths. Asymmetry allows for the causes leading to an 
outcome to be different from those leading to the absence of the outcome.159 For instance, 
if one were to model the inverse of high performance, the results of a correlational analysis 
would be unchanged, except for the sign of the coefficients. In contrast, a causal 
understanding of necessary and sufficient conditions suggests that the set of causal 
conditions leading to the presence of the outcome may be different from the set of 
conditions leading to the absence of the outcome. Even though the presence of a particular 
combination of causes may lead to high performance, it may not be merely the absence of 
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this combination, but the presence of an entirely different set of causes, that leads to low 
performance. 
The possibility of asymmetries between resource strengths and weaknesses has been 
raised in the resource weakness literature, yet the dimension of time has not been 
explored.160 The Potters Bar rail crash in 2002 occurred on a stretch of track maintained by 
Jarvis, and by the end of the year, victims had already begun legal action against both Jarvis 
and Railtrack.161 For Jarvis, the creation of a critical resource weakness, by way of a toxic 
company brand, was immediate, with deep reputational damage and hostility towards the 
firm. The Jarvis case suggests that resource weakness stocks may be accumulated very 
quickly, and as such, may have a more rapid impact on firm performance outcomes than 
resource strengths. The handling of resource weaknesses following their manifestation may 
be particularly important given their destructive nature, with the Jarvis case demonstrating 
how poor management of resource weaknesses may elevate their potency, further reducing 
the likelihood of turnaround.  In addition, the case highlights the risks to firm performance 
that just a small number of resource weaknesses can bring. Whilst the resource-based 
literature suggests that value is created from the combinative effects of a range of resource 
strengths, Jarvis demonstrates the potentially terminal impact of just a very small number of 
resource weaknesses. Rather than mirroring the properties of resource strengths, resource 
weaknesses may have different properties that are more immediate and have far greater 
performance implications than their resource strength counterparts. Consequently, 
resource weaknesses may be of central importance for our understanding of the historical 
performance of companies and the decision-making of current management teams.  
Whilst the resource weakness of Jarvis’s toxic brand was highly destructive on its own, it 
soon became clear that the weakness had the potential to interact with, and elevate the 
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destructive nature of other weaknesses within the company. Arend proposes that 
complementary strategic liabilities may exist where weaknesses combine and reinforce one 
another. In such cases, the costs to the firm will be greater than if the two liabilities existed 
separately.162 Further exploration of this matter was beyond the scope of Arend’s research, 
but the case of Jarvis provides a valuable opportunity to do so. Despite the new focus within 
the construction business, the resource weaknesses in construction risk assessment and 
management persisted. Failure to undertake thorough due diligence and take account of 
the likelihood of unforeseen problems occurring during each project resulted in continuous 
under-pricing and delays. In normal circumstances, running late on one project would be 
unlikely to prevent work with other clients, however, given the ferocity of press attention 
on Jarvis that had emerged due to their involvement with the Potters Bar rail crash, each 
construction blunder was heavily publicised. Consequently, potential clients across the 
country were aware of the company’s failings, impacting on the accumulation of new 
contracts and further increasing the reputation damage to the firm. Virtually every mention 
of Jarvis in the press was followed by a note to remind readers that this was the company 
connected to the Potters Bar train crash. Despite the known shortcomings of Jarvis’s 
refurbishment work, interviews with clients suggested the overall quality of the firm’s 
construction activities was little different to other companies undertaking PFI work and in 
some instances, Jarvis was even above average for satisfaction levels. 
From a resource-based perspective, it has been suggested that resource weaknesses can 
be assessed in a similar manner to resource strengths, utilising approaches derived from the 
work of Barney. 163  For Jarvis, its weaknesses in construction operations certainly 
contributed to the destruction in firm value, but were not rare vis-à-vis other competitors. 
The potency of the weaknesses, however, were elevated to a height much beyond is rivals 
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when combined with the brand weakness suffered in connection with the Potters Bar rail 
crash. The case provides a clear example of how resource weaknesses may combine with 
devastating effect on company outcomes. Gaining new work became increasingly difficult 
for Jarvis, and in one instance, even a campaign was launched aimed at preventing the firm 
from winning a PFI contract due to its history.164 The resource weakness of the Jarvis brand 
that had emanated in the rail division, combined with the resource weaknesses in 
construction operations, created a near perfect storm. In building on Arend’s work, the case 
not only demonstrates how resource weaknesses may interact with one another to 
destructive effect, but also suggests that some resource weaknesses may have a greater 
propensity to combine with others. A resource weakness in the form of a toxic brand may 
have a high level of transferability within an organisation, therefore, creating a heightened 
risk that it may combine with other resource weaknesses inside the firm. For Jarvis, whilst 
transferable within the company, the brand weakness was economically non-transferable 
away from the firm, with efforts to rebrand failing to distance the company from the 
liability. 
In answering calls for further examination of the categories and characteristics of 
resource weaknesses, we suggest that the case of Jarvis provides insight into the nature of 
resource weaknesses and combinations thereof that can prevent turnaround and ultimately 
lead to firm failure.165 Jarvis had a persistent weakness in assessing and managing risk, with 
a lack of due diligence and a failure to account for the potentiality of unforeseen 
construction problems resulting in poor pricing, cost and time overruns. Failure to 
adequately address this weakness ensured its persistence over time and the weakness 
became more salient due to changes in firm strategy. The weaknesses made current 
contracts unprofitable for the business, destroying value. We categorise these as “Type 1 
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Resource Weaknesses”: Resource weaknesses that cause value destruction in existing 
operations. 
In the case of Jarvis we see an underlying Type 1 resource weakness take on a much 
greater salience as the firm changed its strategy to move into new areas of business 
characterized by long contracts. In itself, although the Type 1 resource weakness increased 
in salience due to the strategic re-orientation of Jarvis, its presence may not have been 
terminal. We note that the actions of the leadership of the firm, in failing to grasp the firm’s 
weakness in relation to contracting, led the firm to take on greater risk associated with 
longer contracts. Being locked into longer contracts merely increased the salience of the 
Type 1 resource weakness, which was to increase through the duration of the contracts. 
In addition, the brand weakness resulting from the train crash and aftermath meant that 
trust in the company was so low that the acquisition of new contracts was extremely 
difficult. We categorise this as a “Type 2 Resource Weakness”: Resource weaknesses that 
prevent new value creation opportunities, as presented in table 2. Each of these resource 
weaknesses in isolation can cause serious problems for the firm, but may not be fatal. Type 
1 means current contracts may be unprofitable, but still allows for the firm to invest in 
reducing the weaknesses so that future contracts may be assessed and managed differently. 
Type 2 means new contracts are hard to attract, but if existing contracts are still earning 
returns there is still time to invest in reducing this weakness in the hope it can be overcome 
in the long-run. 
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TABLE 2 
Resource Weakness Categories 
Resource Weakness Category Resource Weakness Case 
Example: Jarvis 
Impact of Resource Weakness 
in Jarvis case 
Type 1 Resource Weakness: 
Destroys value in the existing 
activities of the firm. 
Weakness in the assessment 
and management of risk, 
persistently inadequate due 
diligence. 
Current contracts unprofitable 
– poor pricing, frequent 
unforeseen construction 
problems, cost and time 
overruns. 
Type 2 Resource Weakness: 
Prevents future value creation 
opportunities for the firm. 
Emergence of a toxic brand, 
primarily from the involvement 
of Jarvis in the Potters Bar rail 
crash and handling of the 
aftermath. 
Rapid decline in trust. Company 
under intense scrutiny ‘working 
under a spotlight’ in all of its 
business areas – eg., errors 
made in the construction 
business amplified through 
national media, preventing 
Jarvis from winning new 
contracts.   
 
We suggest that the combination of Type 1 (destroying existing value) and Type 2 
(destroying future value creation opportunities) may be fatal to any organisation. Investing 
to overcome Type 1 (Jarvis risk assessment and management) is only worthwhile if new 
value creation opportunities can be quickly gained, which Type 2 (Jarvis toxic brand) makes 
extremely unlikely. Overcoming Type 2 weaknesses require investment over the long-term, 
and can only be successful if the firm is still generating value from existing operations for 
long enough to provide time to reduce the weakness; and Type 1 prevents this option by 
destroying value in existing operations, therefore, resulting in the firm running out of time 
to trade itself back into a position of sustainability. In summary, we propose that firms 
possessing resource weaknesses that are both Type 1 and Type 2 concurrently, may be at 
greater risk of catastrophic failure. In essence, Jarvis was caught in a resource weakness 
“catch 22”, whereby the Type 1 and Type 2 resource weaknesses re-enforced one another 
and led to the demise of the firm. 
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The case of Jarvis provides a cautionary study in the consideration of both turnaround 
research methods and turnaround strategies. There have been criticisms of the short time 
frames used to assess the success of corporate turnaround efforts, with calls to undertake 
more longitudinal analysis of corporate turnarounds, studying performance over much 
larger time frames.166 The case of Jarvis lends further weight and urgency to this call, with 
the turnaround strategy and ultimate failure of the company being inextricably linked. 
Further research is needed that seeks to examine the performance of turnarounds for a 
substantial period after the event, to enable us to develop a greater understanding of the 
benefits and risks that may emanate from particular turnaround strategies. Second, for 
turnaround practitioners, the case of Jarvis highlights important issues. Whilst path-breaking 
acquisitions have been suggested as a potential route out of persistent failure, rapid 
expansion into new areas of activity brings inherent risks, in particular the concern that 
management fail to fully comprehend the new organisation, creating a heightened risk that 
a resource weakness, or combination of weaknesses, may emerge. Where managers fail to 
remedy these weaknesses, or choose strategies that greatly rely on these deficient 
resources, performance consequences can be catastrophic.  
 
Conclusion 
Through the case of Jarvis we have sought to gain a greater understanding of the factors 
that may hinder or prevent sustained turnaround, ultimately leading to firm failure. The 
RBV, and in particular the concept of resource weaknesses, provide us with valuable insights 
into the importance and nature of resources that detract from firm performance, destroying 
value. The case of Jarvis demonstrates the dangers that may result from failure to address 
resource weaknesses and the risk that strategic shifts to more “attractive” niches may not 
41 
 
always enable a firm to escape prior weaknesses. Indeed we suggest that an analysis of 
resource weaknesses as part of strategic change efforts during turnaround attempts may be 
crucial to ensure that any actions taken do not make existing resource weaknesses more 
salient and destructive for the firm. In addition, contrasting with the belief that resource 
stocks cannot be changed instantaneously, the immediacy and level of the decline in 
resource stocks experienced by Jarvis, resulting from its involvement with the Potters Bar 
rail crash, raises the possibility of important asymmetries between resource strengths and 
resource weaknesses. In addition, whilst value may be created from the combination of 
numerous resource strengths, the Jarvis case shows how only a small number of resource 
weaknesses can have a devastating impact on firm performance, with the management of 
such weaknesses therefore being critical. Finally, the notion that resource weaknesses may 
combine to create costs to the firm greater than if existing in isolation has been mooted in 
previous research.167 The case of Jarvis shows such factors at work, creating a fatal outcome 
and in so doing enables us to propose categories of resource weaknesses that when 
concurrently held, may reduce the likelihood of turnaround.  
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